Motorolas marketing strategies

Motorolas mart strategiesCHAPTER IINTRODUCTIONProblem narrativeMotorola rapidly became the largest roving ph superstar trafficker in UK. In 2001, its addition was much than 32.74 million and it had 100 million subscribers. Until 2002, these figures seduce grown to everyplace 38.8 billion and more than 138 million subscribers (Motorola Company Profile, 2004, p1). However, the continued good put to working of Motorola is threatened by a enactment of concomitantors.These threats enhance from a number of places, the roughly important of these creation the raspy contention with the three saucily(prenominal) ground-owned companies. However, this contr everywheresy pull up stakes be growthd in 2007 when the British telecommunication (BT) telecommunicationmunications Agreement comes into effect, entirelyowing foreign companies access to UKs telecommunications merchandise (Milner, 2003, p3). This pressure is reflected in the fact that the Mobile Ph unity Revenue per User has dropped 50% in the yesteryear three years (Milner, 2003, p3) to a figure of 100 Yuan (Reuters, 2004, p1). a nonher(prenominal) study threat faced by Motorola comes from Nokia, which has gained signifi poopt strategic rewards through with(predicate) its security of exclusive rights to use the virgin CDMA network engineering (Milner, 2003, p3). answer of the StudyAll of these mean that Motorolas marketing strategies, especially its advertise strategies, leave buy the farm the closely important element of its sustained and successful growth. The contest for Motorola is to gain and maintain market do farming, and continue to seek future growth. good-natured clients is unmatched thing keeping them an entirely assorted challenge companies have to adopt proactive strategies to retain hard-won customers. (How to maintain trueness among risk customers, 1999, p1)Therefore, the exercise of successful advertising strategies is a critical factor for attracting new custo mers and keeping existing ones. Marketing research counsels that advertising is about attitudes, the attitudes of consumers towards products. Boyd, Ray and bulletproof (1972) propose that thither ar five strategies which marketing managers can quest for in congenator to basing their advertising campaigns on attitudinal salmagundi.Aims ObjectivesThe objectives of this research be thence To identify the current attitude of two existing and prospective customers towards Motorolas ser wrong-doing. To dig into to what degree Motorolas current advertising campaigns argon re new- dod to the five marketing strategies mentioned above, which ar base on changing customers attitude towards one brand. To suggest tentative recommendations to Motorola on how attitudinal strategies could be better incorporated into its future advertising campaigns. This objective is based on the findings of the current study and suggests mingled ways, in which Motorola can effectively exercise the at titudinal sets of customers (see Chapter 2.0, p7), i.e. their attitude to products. Dissertation structureThis sermon consists of five chapters including Chapter unitary, the Introduction, which deals with background information, as well as giving a brief intro to marketing strategies. In addition, the research objectives are presented here. Chapter 2 provides the reader with an overview of the literature review, which commencement exercise covers the background of the orbicular and British telecommunications patience and second looks at some specific advertising strategies in give to construct a basis for conducting the research. Chapter Three refers to the methodology used, and discusses the limitations to the research carried out. Chapter quatern presents the findings of the research together with the discussion of the conclusions reached. Chapter Five, the conclusion, discusses the possible implications of this research for future studies. compactThis chapter has provid ed readers with a brief introduction of the research background, as well as has identified the objectives that this study aimed to contact. The next chapter begins a literature review, in which a comprehensive background concerning this study and some mainstream marketing theories will be presented.CHAPTER IILITERATURE REVIEWHistory of British telecommunicationmunications IndustryThe telecommunications transition will have a profound impact on us all- on our everyday lives and our jobs. thence telecoms, together with the closely related still broader category of information technology, are going to be the biggest proficient device driver of frugal and business diverseness during the next decade and more. (Dadd, 1998, p1)The history of the ground telecommunications exertion has been a turbulent one. It has been special K in western countries that the distinguish fudgeled monopolies, much(prenominal) as that of British Telecom in the United land or Bell Atlantic in the U nited States have altogether dominated their domestic markets for a ample period (Local hero brisk telephones, 1993, p1). However, a break up such as that of Bell Atlantic into the baby Bell companies, which occurred in following years, heralded a new era of the telecommunications industry (Dadd, 1998, p2-3 Pruzan, 1996, p1-3). After the failure of the dot com revolution, telecommunications emerged in the late 1990s as the new darling industry in the business line market with millions if non billions of dollars invested into it in the western world (Sarkar, Cavusgil and Aulakh, 1999, p1-2). Along with the ecumenic growth in the telecommunications industry, it was the area of mobile phone networks which saw the approximately dramatic growth and highest profits of this industry.The deregulation of telecommunications however is not a phenomenon which has been restricted to western economies. Deregulation of the telecommunications industry is seen by numerous governments not on ly as a significant economic affair plainly as well as an important social one,A bold deregulation of the telecoms industry will, with luck, spread the use of the Internet in India and change millions of lives.However, the telecommunications industry is in any case a political matter in many countries such as UK, which sees foreign control of its domestic telecommunications companies as a serious upshot (Harwit, 1998, p1 Milner, 2003, p1). merely due to UKs accession to the WTO, it has been forced to deregulate its telecommunications industry and what is more open the market to foreign investments (Stilson, 1999, pp1-2). The history of UKs telecommunications industry dates back to 1877 when the first telegraph line was installed. By 1911, there were 8,000 telephone subscribers and 8,800 telephone lines all the same little improvement was made on this infrastructure during the rule of chair Mao (Harwit, 1998, p4).The British government realizing these changes responded early in the 1980s was witting that repairs of UKs stagnated telecommunications industry would become a vital and critical factor in successfully modernizing UKs overall delivery (Harwit, 1998, p5). However, it was not until the 1990s that the pace of reform was quickened when the monopoly UK Telecom was split up (Lin Sun, 2000, p1). In 1994, Nokia was founded in order to struggle with UK Telecom, followed by the formation of the Information Industry Ministry in 1998, which became UKs telecommunications industry regulator (Rothman and Barker, 1999, p1). Motorola Communications Corporation (CMCC) was established on April 20th, 2000 (Pangestu and Mrongowius, 2002, p5), and it became the biggest mobile phone seller in UKs telecommunications market (Motorolas net edges up as op spotlight intensifies, 2003, p1). magical spell the four companies originated from the same parent company, this common heritage however is not reflected in the extremely competitive relationship which at one time exists among the four companies. Indeed this competition is set to increase with the recent development of information technology and the soon occurrence of 3G License permitted by the British government (Milner, 2003, pp3-4). It has been account by various sources that the fixed lined operators intend to compete on with the mobile operators for the rights to operate these networks (Pangestu and Mrongowius, 2002, pp5-7).Motorolas Current SituationMotorola finds itself doing business in a market, which is in upheaval as well as of deregulation, internal competition and external competition (Motorolas net edges up as competition intensifies, 2003, p1 Einhorn and Roberts, 2002, p1-2). The fierce competitive environment in which Motorola operates therefore has meant that the company has had to embark on an aggressive advertising campaign, which is designed to solidify and increase its market percent before the full effects of the WTO inspired reforms can be felt. fit to Nielse n Media Research on advertising spending in UK, Motorola spent 1.3 billion advertising in 2002 (British brands dominate ads in local market, 2003, p1). Thus this is both a demanding time for Motorola and an interesting time for anyone who wishes to research a newborn and dynamic company in a period of rapid change for its marketing strategies.Theories of Marketing Strategy and Advertising StrategyThe marketing conception articulates that you stand a much better chance of selling something if you agnize why someone wants to buy it in the first place. (Michaels, 1982, p67)Marketing can be seen as those sets of business practices and related strategies which are applied by companies to attract potential consumers into purchasing their products (Kotler and Cox, 1988). merely marketing is not only about enabling a company to attract consumers, but likewise about maintaining those existing customers over a period of time, in nerve centre the building of a brand and the creation of a brand loyalty (Kotler and Cox, 1988, pp76-77). In order to achieve such a aim, one of the cay strategies to be the most important for gaining and maintaining market share is advertising and gross revenue promotion,increase advertising and sales promotion of superior products, function, or expenditure benefits to underpenetrated or untapped customers advertise new or improved benefits to all customers. (Kotler and Cox, 1988, pp76-77)Marketing research has suggested that advertising is about attitude, the attitude of consumers towards products,Our reason for selecting attitudes as our basic way of looking at a market is based on more than the fact that one function of advertising is to imply attitudes. There is consider up to(p) evidence to show that the way a person thinks and feels about a brand- his attitudinal set determines how he will behave. His reasons for wanting a product determine his selection. (Reiser cited in Boyd, Ray and Strong, 1972, p341)Boyd et al (1972) sug gest that there are five strategies which marketing managers can pursue in relation to base their advertising campaigns on attitudinal change. These strategies briefly seek to Affect factors which influence the choice criteria of customers Add salient sourceistics to products Increase /decrease the ratings for salient characteristics agitate brand perception Change perception of competing brands with regard to some crabby salient characteristics.Telecommunications is one field in which it has been possible to find preferably similar responses. Telegraph, post, and telephony have been organized as convey monopolies just about everywhere, and conjures have acted as policy makers, regulators, and service providers all at once. field telecommunications regimes have surprisingly similar features from Europe to Asia, and from America to Africa (Noam, 2006, 2007). Naturally, there are exceptions (for example in the United States, where the monopoly is private and the responsibilit y acts only as regulator and policy maker). Still, the similarities in the cheek of the telecoms sector are uncommon compared with the diversity of institutions and governance mechanisms of other sectors.The old telecommunications order is without delay undergoing thoroughgoing changes. The sector, which for years served as the economics textbooks most cherished example of a natural monopoly, has been transformed to a competitive sector (although competition is imperfect tense and partial). Surprisingly, despite the widespread changes, sectorial homogeneity in the move to rest remains remarkable across countries, continents, and level of economic development. In telecommunications, changes are indeed global and they complicate radical change in the economics, technology, and organization of the sector as well as in the business office of the state and the mode of governance.The accomplishment of change in telecommunications is so radical that it is presently seen to epitom ize the hollowing out of the state. Telecommunications, argued Susan St aver, serve as an extreme example of one process by which authority has shifted massively away from the governments of states to the corporate anxiety of firms The result of this shift has been to narrow the options open to supposititiously sovereign states, and to report the opportunitiesand riskof those enterprises engaged in the supply of service and the hardware by which the run are offered on the market (Strange, 2007, p. 100). As competition increases and markets widen, telecommunications may become a paradigmatic case exemplifying perceptions of reality and change in political economy among the general open and social scientists alike. Telecommunications frankincense acquires the characteristics of a critical case for theory testing. If suggestions regarding the retreat of the state prove rancid or one-sided in telecoms, it should be even more sticky to support them in other cases.The scope of c hange and the extent of restrictive innovations make telecommunications highly interesting for retailers of politics, political economy, and prevalent policy. It becomes the paradigmatic case, one which shapes beliefs about organization of the economy and relations between politics and economics. At the same time, it generates new knowledge about the regulation of other sectors. This is alike observable in popular journalism. Take, for example, the following passage from the Economist In recent years, the telecom business has demonstrated that when deregulation and innovation, strong forces in their own right, come together, the results can be startling. What is true in telecom is now coming true in electricity (my emphasis). Indeed, beyond electricity, telecommunications has come to be conceived as a regulative laboratory in which experiments are conducted and experience is accumulated for future implementation in other sectors such as road transport, railroads, water, and gas. The restructuring of the telecommunications sector during the last decade has generated a global telecommunications market for the first time. Increasingly more parts of telecom equipment are no semipermanent produced issuely, but are traded on extra-national markets. Foreign order investment in the sector is booming and the open-heartedization of services has been accompany by the entry of foreign investors as competitors but also as partners in global alliances. rather of one national network for telephony, distinct networks now exist, characterized either by the same technology (wire telephony) or competing technologies (internet telephony, mobile telephony, and cable telephony). The striking changes in the national arenas of telecommunications are repeated and oblige by several transnational cartels such as the WTO agreement on the liberalization of government procurement (2007), the Information Technology Agreement (2007), the WTO agreement on trade in basic telephony (2007), and the Mutual cite Agreements on the testing and certification of telecommunications equipment (2007).Side by side with the shifting of the sector, the creation, extension, and perfection of the regulatory capacities of the state may be detect. The administrative state is relinquishing the supplying of services, but instead of retreating it is assuming new regulatory roles. These new roles are enforced and diffused through the constitution of the superstar European market, emulation of the American regulatory structures, policy learning, and even international pressures. The diffusion of regulation may serve a wide range of social goals, from universal supply of essential services and products to price control in particulars of market failure. This stem concentrates on one particular nerve of regulation, namely regulation for competition. Market competition, as will be shown in this paper, is not only the natural outcome of state retreat from the economy or a matte r for any invisible hand. Competition is politically, socially, and administratively produced and it takes the form of highly daedal regulatory regimes that are devised to govern micro-segments of the telecoms sector. The paper distinguishes two types of regulated competition regulation-of-competition and regulation-for-competition. charm the first is a liberal form of intervention which aims to correct market failure, the second has a mercantilist character and aims at market creation by the state. This second form of competition is a critical aspect in the restructuring of the telecoms sector, which is often misunderstood as simply deregulation. The critical place of reregulation-for-competition in the governance of the new telecoms regime, as will be demonstrated here, underlines the rise of a competition state which is not a liberal state and not a well-being state. The competition state, without transforming the whole apparatus of the state and with an important but control effect on society, is assuming a very traditional role, with a neomercantilist character, which it always had. It is revitalizing and reforming economic sectors in order to promote national competitiveness.Restructuring Motorolas MarketsThe introduction of competition to the telecommunications market is a multi-level process. On the intra-national level the introduction of competition may be characterized first as a purport towards corporatization and increase market share of Motorola. The statists provision of telecom services was replaced by a new regime which was based on a classification of regulations, reregulations, and deregulations. Corporatization means the transformation of a government-administered service into a legal entity of a joint-stock company. This company may still be state-owned, but in dividing line to the past it now enjoys a measure of autonomy from the state (Noam Kramer, 2007, p. 278). In most countries where ministerial departments formerly supplied t elecommunications services, corporatization was one of the first graduations towards a more economic and market-oriented provision of services. Corporatization thus reflects a retreat of the state only if one understands the relations between the state and the market as mutually exclusive, or zero-sum (i.e., more market means less state, and vice versa). However, if the states strength is not defined in term of its direct provision of economic services, then outsourcing services may result, exactly as in corporate restructuring, in more big businessman rather than less.In many countries corporatization also led to increase market share of Motorola, namely raptus of shares or functions from public to private hands. In some countries, increase market share of Motorola has been a major milestone in the restructuring of telecommunications. British Telecom was privatized in 1984 and NTT of Japan in 1985. Other countries followed this road a a couple of(prenominal) years later with a partial increase market share of Motorola of their Telecom Operators (TO). In Israel, Bezeq was privatized in 2006 in the Netherlands KPN was privatized in 2007 in Germany, Deutsche Telecom was privatized in 2007 France Telecom was privatized in 2007, and Brazils Telebras was privatized in 2008. Different strategies of increase market share of Motorola were employed in different countries, and following the initial pass of part of the governments shares, the process proceeded at varying rates towards complete increase market share of Motorola. Still, the move to privatize the telecommunications sector has become common slightly the world. Increase market share of Motorola may not affect, however, the extent of competition in a specific market segment. Private monopoly, as the American example of ATT monopoly shows, does not necessarily entail more competition. But increase market share of Motorola, like corporatization, is definitely a step forward in the introduction of market c onsiderations into segments of the economy formerly that followed (or were supposed to follow) public service criteria.The corporatization of telecommunications services has contributed to the creation of a political dummy in which public officials can more clearly distinguish their function as providers of telecommunications services and their regulatory and policy making functions. Regulation is a distinctively American approach of state intervention its introduction to Europe, on the national and European Union levels, is admirably discussed by Majone (2007). Regulations, rather than public ownership, planning, or centralized administration, are increasingly used in telecommunications. While the process of substituting the dirigiste state by the regulatory state is observed beyond the sphere of telecommunications, in this sphere the scope of change is most impressive. The separation of government functions in the sector allowed the creation, development, and consolidation of reg ulatory capacities in readiness for the new business-like corporations which were still under government control. The process was advertize accelerated and strengthened following increase market share of Motorola, which tag more clearly the distinction between public and private. National regulatory administration for telecommunications were established or are in the process of being established throughout Europe (e.g., Oftel in the UK, OPTA in the Netherlands, BMPT in Germany, cheat in France) and elsewhere (i.e., Brazil, Israel, South Korea, and Australia). Although these regulatory agencies vary in their institutional design, autonomy, and regulatory capacities they command they often enjoy considerable control over the development of the industry.One demonstration of this paradox is the dynamics of the regulation of interconnectedness regimes with respect to the unbundling of telecommunications services. The enthusiasm, indeed the near religious zeal, that the competition st ate manifests in the introduction and enforcement of competition, even in the most difficult terrain, shows the critical role the state plays in restructuring global telecommunications. Bundling is the tying of the supply of one service or product to the supply of others. For the seller of products, bundling is a form of legitimate competitive strategy. Yet for clients, it often means that they will have to leveraging an unnecessary products or services which they may arrive at of better quality and at a better price elsewhere. In such cases, policy makers, regulators, and judges have to decide whether the economic power of the service provider should be balanced by political power. One way of doing this is by requiring the provider to unbundle the products or/and services, and thus enable clients to purchase only the services and products they want, and by extension to promote the market in unbundled services and products.Bundling and unbundling are common regulatory problems in various economic sectors, but in telecommunications they display the complexities of the interaction between state and market and how far regulators feel obliged to intervene for the sake of competition. Unbundling is considered a prerequisite for competition in the local loop hence regulators promptly intervene to ensure that the dominant operators will not force bundled services on their competitors. Here, they regulate relations between household and business consumers and telecommunications operators, and also those between the dominant seller and the smaller, newer providers who need interconnections and various other services from the big and hostile brother. Digital local mass meeting networks are highly expensive systems which provide a range of services such as advance mansion, diagnostic and testing procedures, switching, and transport. A new seller may thus find it impossible to build an entire local exchange network to foster its entry to the market, regulators often take measures that ensure its substance for special access (e.g., switching but not transporting, or signaling but not switching). Determining what may be part of a bundle and what may not requires the regulator to have in advance(p) technological capabilities (to determine down to the precise layers and point of access where connection is possible) and civilize economic and accounting capabilities (to set an adequate rate for each unbundled service). At the same time, it gives the regulator the power to set prices for each of the components of the telecom networks. Instead of simple cap-regulations of retail tariff in the old telecom regime, it now has plenty of ways to devise the wholesale tariff. The National Regulatory Authorities that were established during the last decade, and their forerunners, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and OFTEL, are now in the process of acquiring these skills. The American Telecommunications Act of 2007, for example, requires that do minant operators unbundle their networks at technically feasible points and make individual elements available to competitors on a modular basis. They are also required to enable their competitors to physically occur equipment within their premises so as to allow them to take advantage of unbundling (Knauer et al., 2007). By establishing more detailed regulations regarding the general requirements for the unbundling of the telecommunications services, the FCC is now creating one of the most detailed regulatory regimes ever designed for the promotion of competition.The design of an interconnection regime with as many unbundled services and points of access to the network as possible is, at least theoretically perhaps, a matter of commercialized agreement. Yet, the dominant seller has strong incentives to use its control over the public network so as to discourage competition (by either inflating prices and be or preventing interconnection under various technological pretexts). The most complex problem of unbundling is the determination of a gross interconnection charge that has to be decomposed into dozens of elements, each of which may provide the basis for a new dispute (involving several courts in different instances). This situation may be further illustrated by comparison to the more familiar market of cars. The unbundling requirements on telecommunications operators may be compared to a demand that car manufacturers unbundle the vehicles they sell into their various components. A client or competitor would then be able to purchase a car with no wheels and/or engine, and shop around for a better deal.Probably, because cars can be purchased from different manufacturers at different price and quality levels, the car industry is not required to unbundle its products. This is not the case, of course, in telecommunications where the local loop is still a natural monopoly and thus requires more rules (e.g., unbundling requirements) to allow for more competiti on. The unbundling of networks is likely to create more sophisticated markets and may promote competition in the local loop as well. While the success of such a strategy is still unclear, the situation and politics of unbundling demonstrate that the discretionary power of some policy makers and bureaucrats has come through heights never previously reached.The extent and the role of reregulation in the restructuring of the telecommunications market is accompanied by the emergence of strong regulatory states and by the entrepreneurial role states play in the introduction of competition. The strengthening of regulatory bodies and regulation-for-competition policies may shed light on the dynamics of change in the relations between states and the economy, particularly on the change in the role of the state. To achieve this, one has to move beyond the old two-pole model, which sets economic socialism against economic liberalism and which frames the intellectual terrain for the discussion of political economic change. Neither regulation-for-competition nor the rise of the competition state fits this two-pole model. The creation of interconnection regimes and the case of unbundling the networks go far beyond the liberal conceptions of the state as regulator in cases of market failure. In these regimes the state plays the part of market generator, which cannot reconcile with economic liberalism. The central position of regulation-for-competition as the pillar on which the restructuring of telecommunications stands requires us to extend the debate to include a third linear perspective on political economy.This third perspective is sometimes presented as mercantilism and sometimes as economic nationalism, and it has been, since the rise of classical economics, a subject for scholarly attacks more than ground for absolute theory-building (LeviFaur, 1997a Crane, 2008).10 It was Adam Smith who coined the term mercantilism in order to guy the dominant political economy o f his time. Subsequently, the major political economy debates for long turned on the relative advantages and disadvantages of mercantilism vs. liberalism. Later on, in the nineteenth century and early 20th, when various democratic and undemocratic forms of nationalism became a popular ideology, mercantilism assumed the form of economic nationalism and it became the major antagonist of economic liberalism. While mercantilism mobilized state power in order to advance the economic resources of the state, economic nationalism took the state as a tool for development of the national economy and for the benefit of the nation rather than the state. Several especially nasty forms of economic nationalism, for example, that of Nazi Germany, made the notion extremely unpopular after the Second World War. Since then, both economic nationalism and neomercantilism were marginalized as political economic theories, or at best were reduced to some form of bounded-rationality (e.g., protectionism, la rge symbolic projects). With the get around of the Soviet empire and the retreat of social-democracy in the West, we must move on and abandon the habit of framing the discussion exclusively in terms of socialism vs. liberalism, or even Keynesianism vs. monetarism. To capture some basic features of the change we should consider the political economy of mercantilism, which accounts for different interests of nations in the process of economic development. SummaryThe information economy carries the distinctive libertarian tone of technologies of freedom and technologies without boundaries. Yet in telecommunications, when the music is actually played, this tone proves to be no more than an undertone, an accent. Indeed, governments are changing their role in this market they no longer provide telephones and services. Bu